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Abstract
There is a paucity of literature concerning the relation between the
resource utilization decisions of the salaried hospital based physician
and patient outcomes in a national health service. The purpose of our
study is to model and test hospital production where the major deci-
sion makers are physicians. We view the output of the hospital as a
distribution function over flnal health states of the patient. Our model
contains a utility function for physicians whose arguments include the
expected flnal health status of the patient and a pressure function
which re°ects the resource allocation and hospital flnancing policy of
the Portuguese Health Ministry. Two sets of flrst order conditions de-
rived from the theoretical model are estimated within a simultaneous
equations framework using data consisting of inpatient discharges for
the most frequent non-obstetric DRG during the 1992-1999 time pe-
riod. We flnd evidence that budget setting methods and the possession
of a third party payer outside of the NHS are important predictors for
use of the resource in question. Moreover, we flnd that use of the re-
source is important in predicting the flnal health status of the patient.
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1 Introduction
Avedis Donabedian, according to the World Health Organization, is the
most in°uential thinker on the quality of health care. His lecture on the
evaluation of physician competence provides us with an intuition as to the
decision-making process of the hospital based physician (Donabedian, 2000).
He states that the primary responsibility of the physician is for the individual
patient. However, the physician is responsible not only for one individual
but a caseload so that limits must be placed on the time, attention and
resources attributed to any given patient. This implies that the physician
becomes a important flgure in resource allocation and the optimal resource
allocation is important for quality of care. He also distinguishes between
the role of the physician in private practice and in an organization. He
claims that in private practice the physician resolves contradictions between
the optimal solution for an individual and caseload by limiting the number
of cases. However, in an organized setting such as the hospital, the physi-
cian may not have this capability. Here the physician may be asked to
consider the cost of clinical decisions, not for the individual patient, but
for the collectivity, introducing a third element into the physician-patient
relationship. We can conclude from Professor Donabedian’s writing that
the physician may be faced with a dilemma of acting in the interests of
the patient and society, when the optimal solutions difier. Moreover, this
dilemma may be exacerbated when the health care system is characterized
by a national health service.
There is a paucity of literature concerning the relationship between the
diagnosis and treatment decision-making of the hospital based physician
and inpatient outcomes in health care systems characterized by a National
Health Service (NHS). Acute care hospitals in many European health care
systems are owned by either a central or regional government authority
and are constrained by annual budgets set by the government authority.
Generally, all personnel including physicians are contracted on a salary basis.
Unlike physician behavioral models which typify private health care markets,
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the hospital based physician in this type of system can not alter his income
via his diagnosis and treatment decisions. We propose that the typical NHS
hospital based physician faces a dilemma between acting as a perfect agent
for the patient and his or her role as an agent for the hospital administration
whose objective is to restrain hospital spending within targets set by the
Health Administration Authority (e.g. Ministry of Health).
The purpose of our study is to model and test hospital production in a
national health service where the major resource decision makers are physi-
cians. We depart from most existing literature in two ways. First, we pro-
pose a difierent theoretical model of hospital output. We view the output of
the hospital as a distribution function over flnal possible health states of the
patient. Second, we characterize the dilemma faced by the hospital based
physician by specifying his utility as a function of the expected flnal health
status of the patient and flnancial pressure resulting from resource alloca-
tion and flnancing policy of the Health Administration Authority. Finally
we estimate a simultaneous equations model using all inpatient non-transfer
discharges in the most frequent non-obstetric diagnosis related group for all
Portuguese public hospitals during the January 1992-July 1999 time period.
This illustrates the use of a structural approach to physician decision-making
in the hospital.
We provide a framework for the theoretical model in section two and
a description of the data, empirical speciflcation and estimation technique
in section three. The empirical results and conclusions are elaborated in
sections four and flve respectively.
2 Previous Physician Behavioral Models
The theoretical literature regarding physician behavior in hospitals tradi-
tionally models physician utility as a function of income and leisure as well
as ethical and prestige constraints (e.g. Pauly, 1980; Dionne and Contan-
driopoulos, 1985; Folmer et.al.,1997). However, the applicability of these
models is restricted to health care systems where physicians are paid in
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some manner other than a flxed salary and can therefore augment their hos-
pital related incomes by altering resource utilization. Physicians employed
in public hospitals in a national health service that are paid by salary for
a certain number of hours per time period should have other arguments in
their utility function. They may seek to maximize the utility of an expected
ex post patient group as described by Clark and Olsen (1994), or their goal
may be to maximize the expected health outcome of a particular patient,
taking into account the opportunity cost per unit of flnancial resources as
shown in Whynes (1996).These two studies show that even when own in-
come considerations do not condition the decision making of the physician,
he or she will be aware of some sort of constraint on resource usage. Clark
and Olsen argue that in the case where physician’s resource decisions can
endogenously afiect the health service budget, physicians will maximize the
utility of society, which may be difierent from the desires of the individual
patient, in order to avoid punishment from private contributors. Whynes
argues that ethical physicians in a national health service will not behave
myopically but recognize that their decisions regarding a particular patient
may afiect the availability of resources for other patients and will thus take
into account the opportunity cost of their resource decisions.
While Whynes’ model of physician behavior does describe the physician
as assigning subjective possibilities to a range of possible post-treatment
outcomes, he does so in a general way and does not specify the outcomes.
Hospital outcomes research has received a great deal of attention in the
health services literature, particularly regarding the efiects of prospective
payment systems on adverse outcomes (Cutler, 1995). Cutler’s model as-
sumes that an individual is admitted to a hospital with a latent measure of
illness which is a function of individual frailty characteristics and hospital
treatment. The probability of an adverse outcome deflned as death in the
hospital, death after discharge or re-admission, is increasing in the level of
sickness. Cutler goes on to model in-hospital mortality as a logit model and
the probabilities of the other two adverse outcomes as a proportional haz-
ard model. However, the linkage between the physician’s decision regarding
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resource utilization and patients outcomes is not clear. Our model attempts
to clarify this relation in the context of a national health service by taking
into account the impact of the physician’s decisions regarding resource usage
on the patient’s outcome.
The model must maintain a manageable and simple formulation, in or-
der to be viably estimated using the available data. The building blocks
are, flrst, a production function, describing the relation between the inputs,
hospital resources, and the output, patients’ health status. Second, a char-
acterization of the physician’s decision concerning resource utilization must
be provided. We now describe each block in detail.
2.1 Our Notion of Hospital Production
Our model of hospital production begins by deflning output as a distribution
of probabilities of the patient being discharged with a particular outcome.
It difiers somewhat from Cutler’s model in that we consider that individuals
are endowed with an initial health stock which can be increased through
investment in health (medical care, life-style changes, etc.) and is subject to
stochastic discrete depreciation shocks characterized by any illness or injury
that causes a large reduction in the stock of health (e.g. Picone et al., 1998;
Grossman, 1972). Whenever the health stock is below some threshold, the
individual seeks hospital treatment.1
At the moment of entry to the hospital, the individual can be described
by an initial health status, H0, and by a set of personal characteristics.
These personal characteristics in°uence efiectiveness of any future treat-
ment. Health status as well as personal characteristics may have unobserv-
able as well as observable elements. The goal of hospital treatment is to
change the distribution so that, in our model, the production of the hospital
is a change in the distribution function over possible flnal health states or
outcomes, given the initial health status of the patient, H0, and other patient
1Patients in Portugal are obliged to seek treatment in the hospital whose catchement
area includes their residence so that selectivity issues which characterize U.S. and U.K.
studies (Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997) are not relevant for this study.
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characteristics which may afiect the self-healing capabilities and resources
used in the diagnosis and treatment of the patient.
This approach implies that a discharge with full recovery and death can
be seen as the same output of the hospital. The two very difierent outcomes
are just distinct realizations of the same distribution function. Both out-
comes can be associated with the very same use of resources. The problem
to the outside observer is that he can not observe the true distribution func-
tion for each patient. Typically, only a flnite (and small) partition of the
outcomes space will be observed. For example, in the application (described
in detail below) what we observe are two possible health outcomes for each
patient: discharged alive or in-hospital death. In our framework, these two
outcomes represent discrete values of a continuous random variable, the flnal
health status of the patient. Thus, the modelling of hospital output must
incorporate this observational constraint. More speciflcally, if the health
status of a hospitalized individual falls below a certain threshold, Hd, the
outcome is in-hospital death. For values above Hd the patient is discharged
alive. Obviously such simple coding of flnal health status implies a loss of
information.2 We also cannot include death after discharge as an outcome
due to a lack of computerized obituary information as well as privacy laws
in Portugal.
We now deflne the production function of the hospital as:
Pr(H1k) = p(H
0
k ;xk;yk; ·) (1)
where xk is a vector of resources used in the diagnosis and treatment of
patient k, containing i = 1; : : : ; I; possible resources, yk is a vector of patient
characteristics which may afiect healing capabilities, indexed by j = 1; : : : ; J
and · is a hospital quality indicator. Our notion of quality is a simple
one: for the same initial health status, patient characteristics and resource
utilization, a higher quality hospital has a better probability distribution
over flnal health states. Hence, a distribution of flnal health states, H^
2We exclude outcomes which result in transfers due to a lack of information regarding
the receiving hospital and reason for transfer. This information has begun to be recorded
in Portuguese hospitals as of January 2000.
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is better than another distribution ~H if H^ exhibits flrst-order stochastic
dominance over ~H.
2.2 The Role of Physicians
The major decision makers in our model are physicians. They afiect the flnal
health status distribution of the patient through their decisions regarding
resource utilization. We assume that it is the physician who decides whether
a patient will receive a particular resource based on his or her expectations
regarding the e–cacy of the resource and taking into account the flnancial
pressure exerted by the hospital administration. The physician chooses xik
to maximize his/her own utility, xik being the i-th element of xk. Utility
of physicians is derived from two arguments. One is the expected flnal
health status of the patient ,E
¡
H1k
¢
,which enters positively into the utility
function. The second is the pressure exerted by the hospital administration
to constrain resource utilization within an annual budget set by the Health
Administration Authority. The form in which pressure enters the utility
function will depend on the manner in which budgets are set.
In the case of our application, hospital budgets in Portugal are set in a
unique manner. Since 1997, DRG case-mix has been a gradually increasing
component of budgets.3 Also, for flnancing purposes, hospitals are allocated
into flve difierent groups where the DRG base price is adjusted depending
on the group the hospital belongs to. These difierences range from group
1 whose hospitals receive 30% more than the base price to group 5 whose
hospitals receive 20% less than the base price. As a further complication,
inpatient admissions which are covered by non-NHS third party payers are
obliged to pay all public hospitals based on the DRG base price.4 This
formulation actually implies that hospital budgets are partially °exible to
the extent that a hospital receives a signiflcant number of patients with
alternate third party payers.
3In 1999, 30% of hospital budgets were based on inpatient case-mix.
4Payment may be less than or greater than the base price if the patient’s length of stay
is less than the inferior outlier limit or greater than the superior outlier limit deflned for
that DRG.
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Another important potential factor in the pressure function may be the
availability of the resource in the hospital. Many hospitals in Portugal do
not have important technologies physically on site. When a hospital does
not have the technology whose services are ordered by the physician, the
exam or treatment must be done in other public hospitals or private clinics
and paid for out of the hospital’s budget.
Formally, the physician’s utility function can be depicted as:
U = U(E(H1k); ’k);
@U
@E(H)
> 0;
@U
@’
< 0;
@2U
@E(H)2
< 0;
@2U
@’2
> 0 (2)
where ’ is the pressure function.
.
The dilemma or \choice problem" faced by the physician regarding pa-
tient k is thus:
max
xik
U(E(H1k j H0k ;xk;yk; ·); ’) (3)
For the case of continuous variables, the flrst-order conditions for solving
this problem are:5
@U
@E(H)
@E(H)
@xi
+
@U
@’
@’
@xi
= 0 (4)
Since many types of treatment or diagnostic resources are only used once
if at all , the flrst-order conditions accommodate a discrete change setting:
x⁄i =
8<:
1 if U(E(H1 j xi = 1); ’(xi = 1)) ‚
(E(H1 j xi = 0); ’(xi = 0));
0 if otherwise
The flrst-order conditions will be the basis of our analysis, as they de-
scribe optimal behavior of physicians. The next section describes the em-
pirical implications of this simple model of physician behavior.
5Second-order conditions are satisfled, given the regularity assumptions made.
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3 Econometric Speciflcation and Estimation
To illustrate the potential application of our model of hospital output and
physician decisions, we will estimate resource usage coupled with health
outcome with data from all Portuguese public hospitals for a particular
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG). The speciflc DRG is Cerebrovascular
Disorders except transient ischemic attack and is the most frequent non-
obstetric DRG. The resource we focus on is the Computerized Tomography
scan (CAT). This procedure is essentially a diagnostic tool. As such, the
use of the CAT may improve the diagnostic capacity of the physician and
thereby shift the health outcome distribution towards higher health status
levels.
The data were made available by the Portuguese Ministry of Health and
include 140 829 discharges whose outcomes did not end in transfer for 79
hospitals in this DRG. The mortality rate for this DRG is quite high (22%)
and varies between hospitals from 10.01% to 47.61%. The use of the CAT is
widespread (it is performed on approximately 60% of patients in this DRG),
which seems to make this DRG a good candidate for testing the model.
Despite its widespread use, there is a great variability in the use of the CAT
between hospitals, ranging from 0.8 percent in the hospital with the lowest
utilization to 92.45 percent in the hospital with the most frequent use of
this technology.Patients in this DRG are essentially elderly (average age of
71 years) and with no predominance of either gender (see Tables 3 and 4 for
descriptive statistics).
The econometric speciflcation contains, according to the model pre-
sented, an equation for the generation of health outcomes and an equation
describing usage of resources. We flrst specify the production process of
flnal health status. We assume that the e–cacy of a diagnostic or treatment
resource may interact with patient and hospital characteristics due to difier-
ences in patient healing capacity and hospital quality, so that the underlying
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response model is specifled as non-linear:
Hk = (1+
X
i
µixik)
0@X
j
fijyjk +
X
h
bh·hk
1A+ "k (5)
where k = 1; ::; n indexes the observations from the sample, fi are the pa-
rameters on the individual characteristics which impact on the healing ca-
pabilities of the patient,b are the parameters on hospital characteristics and
µ are the parameters on resources. Finally, "k is a random term, assumed
to follow a normal distribution.
To proxy for initial conditions, we include dummy variables for age and
gender, severity (using primary and secondary diagnoses) as well as the
manner in which the patient was admitted to the hospital (planned, transfer
from another acute care hospital or emergency room). In order to test this
model we consider only one resource, the use of the CAT(x1). The speciflc
functional form allows for the prediction of a flnal health status when the
resource is not used and the use of the resource is expected to increase the
flnal health outcome (thus, µi > 0).
The health index H is not observed. As mentioned above, only two
crude indicators are available: death or discharged alive. This situation
indicates the applicability of a probit model, as death results if H < Hd =
0 (normalization at no generality cost), and discharge alive if H > Hd.
Therefore, each observation can fall into one of these two categories. For
each observation in the sample we can deflne a variable dk = 1 if the patient
is discharged alive and zero otherwise.
The log likelihood for the probit is thus:
L =
nX
k=1
dk ln '(Hk) + (1¡ dk) ln [1¡ '(Hk)]
where ' is the cumulative standard normal distribution.
The second element of the empirical model is an equation for resource
use. The response function is determined by
U(E(H j x1 = 1); ’(x1 = 1)) ‚ U(E(H j x1 = 0); ’(x1 = 0)) (6)
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which also lends itself naturally to a probit model.
To proceed to estimation, we need to specify a functional form for the
utility function of doctors. We assume an additive separable function on
the expected health status of patients and flnancial pressure. The form
of the physician’s utility function should re°ect that his change in utility
from ordering the CAT will depend on the physician’s belief regarding the
e–cacy of the CAT for that particular patient. We assume that utility
changes resulting from increases in patient health status due to the use of
the resource is greater for patients with lower levels of initial health status
than for those in the upper tails of the distribution function so that the
logarithmic function is an adequate speciflcation for this component of the
physician’s utility function.
U(E(H); ’) = °1 ln (E(H))¡ °2(’) (7)
The utility change due to a CAT in the flrst component is therefore:
°1 ln(E(H j x1 = 1))¡ °1 ln(E(H j x1 = 0)) = °1 ln(1 + µ1) = ‚1 (8)
The pressure function ’(¢) is specifled to be negative and increasing in
diminishing levels of hospital funding, reduced availability of a CT scanner
in the hospital and the lack of a third party payer for the patient. We also
include dummy variables for the year of admission in the pressure function
to re°ect changes in technology adoption and budget setting methodologies
over time.
Thus, the difierence in the pressure functions from ordering the scan is
simply:
°2 (’(x1 = 1))¡ °2(’(x1 = 0)) = !0 +
X
l
!lzl
>From these assumptions, the equation deflning the physician’s decision to
order a scan is associated with a latent variable m⁄ given by:
m⁄ = ‚1 ¡ !0 ¡
X
l
!lzl + v = b0 ¡
X
l
!lzl + v (9)
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is therefore making use of (6) where b0 collects all the constant terms (‚1
and !0), the zl are the variables representing flnancial pressure and ” is a
random term (which follows a normal distribution) .
The corresponding log likelihood is given by:
L =
nX
k=1
mk ln '(b0 +
X
l
!lzl) +
nX
k=1
(1¡mk) ln[1¡ '(b0 +
X
l
!lzl)] (10)
where mk is the indicator function for observation k, which has value 1 if
xi = 1. Technically, the model is estimated using the method of maximum
likelihood. The joint log likelihood is just the sum of individual log likeli-
hoods, as the error terms were assumed to be independent (the assumption
was not made on the reduced form equations but on the structural equa-
tions).6
The deflnitions of the variables used in the estimation of the model are
presented in Tables 1 and 2.
4 Results for the Health Status and Resource Uti-
lization Equations
The probit equation for health status whose results are shown in Tables
5 and 6 includes variables for age (the youngest category being omitted),
gender, admission status, primary and secondary diagnosis codes, time, and
the resource of interest (CAT). We include 78 hospital dummy variables in
order to control for hospital flxed efiects and measure difierences in hospital
quality. The omitted hospital is that with the greatest number of admissions
in DRG 14 in Portugal. The signs on the age variables show that individ-
uals between 66 and 80 (OLD) and those older than 80 (VERYOLD) are
predicted to have a lower flnal health status, ceteris paribus, than younger
patients as could be expected. The difierence between patients under the
age of 18 (MIDAGE) and between 18 and 65 is not statistically signiflcant.
We flnd that masculine patients (MALE) have a lower expected flnal health
6The structural parameters !0 and °1 cannot be estimated directly from the model as
specifled.
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status than their female counterparts, a result consistent with prior studies
(Yuan et al.,1998) Admission status is very important as well in predicting
flnal health status. Those patients who were transferred in from another
acute care hospital (TRANSIN) and those who were admitted through the
emergency room (URGADM) have a lower predicted flnal health status than
those patients whose admission was planned.7
Since DRG 14 includes a number of pathologies, descriptive statistics
show that these patients are diagnosed with one of eleven diagnosis codes.
The most frequent diagnosis code (Cerebral artery occlusion, unspecifled,
ICD-9-CM 434.9) is the omitted primary diagnosis in our estimation. Sec-
ondary diagnoses may also be important in determining the flnal health
status of the patient. Therefore we include secondary diagnoses which have
previously been determined to in°uence the flnal health status of patients
admitted with stroke. (Yuan et al.,1998).
Our results indicate the importance of controlling for both primary and
secondary diagnosis codes. A primary diagnosis of Subarachnoid hem-
orrhage (PD430), Intracerebral hemorrhage (PD431), Subdural hemorrhage
(PD4321), Unspecifled intracranial hemorrhage (PD4329) and Acute, but ill-
deflned cerebrovascular disease (PD436) has a negative impact on predicted
flnal health status of the patient relative to the most frequent diagnosis while
a primary diagnosis of Cerebral aneurysm, nonruptured (PD4373) or Apha-
sia (7843) has a positive impact. Though there is a potential inflnite number
of secondary diagnosis codes that these patients may have on admission or
acquire during their hosptal stay, eleven are found to be important in neg-
atively afiecting the patient’s predicted health status. These are: Pneumo-
nia, organism unspecifled (SD486), Congestive heart failure (SD4280), Left
heart failure (SD4821), Heart failure, unspecifled (SD4289), Pneumococcal
pneumonia (SD481), Bacterial pneumonia unspecifled (SD4829), Bronchop-
neumonia, organism unspecifled (SD485), Acute renal failure, unspecifled
(SD5849), Chronic renal failure, unspecifled (SD585), Renal failure, unspec-
7Third party payer status as a potential measure of socio-economic status was tested
but not found to be signiflcant in predicting flnal health status
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ifled (SD586) and Alcoholic cirrhosis of liver (SD5712).8
The most important result from this equation is the large and signiflcant
positive coe–cient on CAT which indicates that performance of a scan has a
strong positive impact on the predicted health status of patients classifled in
DRG 14. This result conflrms the e–cacy of this technology in the diagnosis
of patients with cerebrovascular disorders. However, there are clearly other
factors afiecting the flnal health status of patients which cannot be identifled
from the available information but can be proxied by hospital flxed efiects.
Given that the omitted hospital is that with the highest caseload, it is inter-
esting to note that a majority (51) of hospitals have a signiflcantly higher
expected flnal health status for these patients than the omitted hospital,
with only six having signiflcantly lower coe–cients at the 99% and 95% con-
fldence levels This result is contrary to the positive volume efiects normally
encountered in surgical pathologies.(Hamilton and Hamilton, 1997) We con-
clude that 21 hospitals (26.9%) have a similar quality as the coe–cients on
these hospital dummies were not statistically signiflcant.9
Perhaps the most disturbing results from the health status equation is
that which can be gleaned from the coe–cients on the year dummy variables.
Given the magnitude of the coe–cients as well as the z scores, our results
appear to indicate that expected health status for patients in DRG 14 was
higher between during the years 1992-1995 than in latter years. The coe–-
cient on 1996 is positive and signiflcant at the 90% confldence level and the
coe–cients on 1997 and 1998 are positive but not statistically signiflcant.
Moreover, the coe–cients as well as the z scores increase between 1992 and
1994 and then begin to decline.
This result may be due to an important problem with our study, the
inability to control for re-incidence. Our data do not include patient identi-
flers due to privacy concerns by the Portuguese Ministry of Health. Previous
8Other secondary diagnosis codes such as 250-Diabetes mellitus, 429.0-Myocarditis,
unspecifled, 412-.Old myocardial infarction, and 427.31-Atrial flbrillation were not found
to be statistically signiflcant.
9One of these hospitals has a negative cofiecient and one has a positive coe–cient
statistically signiflcant at the 90% confldence level.
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studies have shown that the cumulative risk for recurrence of stroke over 5
years is high, ranging from 33% to 50% of people who have previously had
a stroke. (Bonita, 1992). Since our data cover a 7 1/2 year time period, it
is likely that there are a signiflcant number of admissions due to a second or
higher incidence of stroke for the same previously admitted patient. Since
recurrent strokes have a higher case fatality (Bonita, 1992), this phenomena
could account for the decline in expected health status despite an increase
in the use of the CAT.
The estimated hospital flxed efiects can be taken as a quality/e–ciency
efiect. Everything else constant, a higher value of the flxed efiect means a
higher expected health status for the patient, which is equivalent to a higher
survival probability. The hospitals in Portugal difier considerably in size and
specialties. In order to test for overall group difierences due to the special
characteristics of lower level (smaller) hospitals, the model was re-estimated
with their exclusion (resulting in 17 790 observations being removed from
the sample). The results for this more restricted sample demonstrate similar
qualitative and quantitative implications.10
To provide a more intuitive interpretation of hospital flxed efiects, we
compute a e–ciency score in the following way. Assume that we want to
measure the expected health status of patients under a common usage of
resources and in a given year, allowing for difierences in hospital charac-
teristics. Holding constant the physician’s decision to order the CAT, this
implies that we observe the latent health index averaged over all patients in
the sample. The reason to maintain constant the resource usage decision is
to avoid confusing hospital-speciflc efiects with physician decision variabes.
After computing the average health index for each hospital (including the
flxed efiect), we normalize the highest value of the expected health index
to 1. Hence, the resulting values can be seen as e–ciency scores which by
construction fall in the range [0,1].
Figure 1 reports the histogram of the e–ciency scores. From it, we see
that there are flve hospitals that stand out as clearly more e–cient than the
10Estimates and details are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 1: Histogram of Hospital E–ciency Scores
others (average e–ciency score of 0.9). The majority of hospitals cluster
around an e–ciency score of 0.47, with a mean value of 0.46 for the total
sample.Further research should be devoted to understanding the sources of
these difierences.11
Given the importance of the CAT scan in determining the predicted flnal
health status of the patient, we now turn to the variables that potentially
afiect the physician’s decision to order the scan. Here we use year dummies
to re°ect changes in technology adoption and budget setting methods with
1999 being the omitted year. We also include dummy variables for the
budget groups with the highest budget group (group 1) being the omitted
category. We control for availability of the resource on site by including
variables re°ecting the presence of the CT Scanner with multiple number
of scanners being the omitted category. We control for the in°uence of the
11Regression of flxed efiects on hospital characteristics such as hospital type, size, teach-
ing status and region reveals that hospitals of medium size and those in the northern region
of Portugal appear to be the most e–cient. However, the equation has a low overall signif-
icance so that these are probably not the most adequate measures of e–ciency difierences.
Details are avaible upon request from the authors.
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patient’s payer status using possession of an alternative third party payer as
the omitted category. We also include interaction terms between year and
payer status in order to assess changes of the impact of payer status over
time. Finally, we include regional dummy variables in order to control for
potential variations in medical practice style. The results are presented in
Table 7.
We can verify that the probability of doing a scan has increased with
time whether due to technology adoption or modiflcations in budget method-
ologies, apparently resulting in a monotonic decrease in pressure over time.
Even so, we flnd that the difierences in budgets re°ected by membership in
a particular payment group is very important with the lower budget cat-
egories generally impacting negatively on the probability of the physician
ordering a scan, ceteris paribus.
A curious result is the larger negative coe–cients on two of the more gen-
erous groups (GRP2 and GRP3) relative to that whose budget is based on
100% of the DRG payment (GRP4). Since the rationale for partitioning of
hospitals into these budget categories is not always clear (e.g. Group 3 con-
sists of only one hospital), the coe–cients may re°ect a lack of consistency
in attributing some hospitals to the most adequate category. The patient’s
payer status is also very important with national health service only (NHS)
patients seeing their likelihood of receiving a scan decline relative to other
patients who have an alternative third party payer, a result which has quite
serious implications for those individuals lacking an alternative third party
payer. We can infer from the coe–cients on the interaction terms that this
phenomena was exacerbated in 1993. For the years 1992, 1994-1996 and
1998, the coe–cients on the interaction terms are not signiflcantly difierent
from zero and the coe–cient is positive and signiflcantly difierent from zero
(95% level) for 1997, a curious result.
Still, we cannot infer unequivocally that doctors in the NHS react to
the third party coverage of patients. According to our structural model, the
in°uence of third party coverage on decisions is exerted in an indirect way,
through the pressure function of hospital administrators. Even taking into
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Figure 2: Third Party Payer Efiect On Probability of CAT Usage Over Time
consideration the (lack of) statistical signiflcance of estimated coe–cients, it
is instructive to further explore the economic signiflcance of the phenomenon
these coe–cients may be capturing. This interpretation is motivated by the
fact that pressure from hospital managers comes from total activity of the
hospital and not on the basis of each particular patient, our unit of observa-
tion. Hospitals with a higher proportion of third party covered patients will
have lower pressure overall so that physicians will conduct more CAT scans
on all patients. Viewing the estimates in this manner, we observe that usage
of the CAT scan in NHS patients has increased more rapidly as a percentage
of total patients over time as shown in Figure 2.
The underlying trend seems to be that hospitals with a higher proportion
of NHS only patients had a relatively steeper decrease in pressure (increase in
the probability of ordering the CAT ) over time. Of course, one must keep
in mind that difierences between the two are only statistically signiflcant
in 1993 and 1997, the year in which the NHS hospital budgets were flrst
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calculated partially based on case-mix (10%).Still, this raises an interesting
question to be answered with data from other DRGs. Namely, the impact
of (topping-up) insurance coverage in a NHS type health system. Moreover,
we cannot take a normative view on this efiect. It may be judged as positive
or negative, depending on whether one believes that usage of the CAT has
been below or above the social optimum level. Nonetheless, our flndings
suggest that future work should explore this efiect.
Resource availability on site is extremely important. It is not surprising
that the lack of a CT scanner (NOCAT) has a signiflcantly negative in°uence
on the probability of the patient having a scan. From an economic stand-
point, the cost of doing a scan is much higher for hospitals who do not have
a scanner because they must pay the full cost of the scan out of their budget
(versus variable costs for those with a machine) as well as transportation
costs. It is also possible that lack of a scanner may increase the utilization
of other resources if patients stay longer in the hospital waiting for a scan ,
further increasing total patient costs .The number of scanners also appears
to be important in determining utilization of the scan, with possession of
only one scanner (ONECAT) negatively impacting the probability of doing
a scan relative to the possession of a multiple number of scanners.
Regional variations in medical practice do appear to exist with all four
other regions having statistically signiflcant negative coe–cients relative to
the omitted Lisbon and Vale de Tejo region. The negative coe–cients are
largest for the Alentejo region (ALENTEJO), also the poorest in Portugal.
One must question why patients entering Lisbon hospitals have a higher
probability of receiving a scan. Since Lisbon is the capital of Portugal as
well as the center for all government policy, including health, physicians may
have better access to medical information and/or other resources, variables
which cannot be measured in our model.
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5 Conclusions
The aim of our paper is to test a model of physician behavior in a hospital
setting within a national health service. Not only do we consider the factors
afiecting the physician’s decision regarding resource utilization but also its
impact on the flnal health status of the patient. We flnd evidence that for
at least one major diagnosis related group and one important resource, bud-
get setting methods and the possession of a non- National Health Service
third party payer by the patient is important in the decision to the use the
resource in question, the Computerized Tomography Scan. The availability
and quantity of CT Scanners in the hospital is also a very important pre-
dictor in the patient receiving a Scan. Though the likelihood of a patient
receiving a scan has increased with time, there are regional difierences in the
probability of receiving a scan with patients in regions outside of the capi-
tal city having a lower probability. Since we also flnd evidence that the use
of the Scan has an important positive impact on the patient’s flnal health
status, the decision to not use a Scan on patients classifled in DRG 14 is a
serious decision. These results may have important policy implications for
the Portuguese Ministry of Health as well as other countries whose systems
are characterized by a national health service or by a similar professional
structure. Further research needs to be conducted on other diagnoses and
resources in order to verify if these results are particular to this DRG and
resource.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Variable Descriptions
NAME DEFINITION
LIVE =1 if the patient is discharged alive
MIDAGE =1 if 18 <= age <=65
OLD =1 if 66<=age<= 80
VERYOLD =1 if age> 80
TRANSIN =1 if the patient is admitted by transfer
URGADM =1 if the admission is through the emergency room
NHS =1 if the patient has only national health service coverage
1992 =1 if the patient was admitted in 1992
1993 =1 if the patient was admitted in 1993
1994 =1 if the patient was admitted in 1994
1995 =1 if the patient was admitted in 1995
1996 =1 if the patient was admitted in 1996
1997 =1 if the patient was admitted in 1997
1998 =1 if the patient was admitted in 1998
1999 =1 if the patient was admitted in 1999
CAT =1 if the patient received a CT scan
NOCAT =1 if the hospital does not have a CT Scanner
ONECAT =1 if the hospital has one CT Scanner
GRP2 =1 if the budget based on 120% of DRG rate
GRP3 =1 if the budget based on 105% of DRG rate
GRP4 =1 if the budget based on 100% of DRG rate
GRP5 =1 if the budget based on 80% of DRG rate
NORTH =1 if hospital located in the northern region
CENTRAL =1 if hospital located in the central region
ALENTEJO =1 if hospital located in the Alentejo region
ALGARVE =1 if hospital located in the Algarve region
Notes: (a) Group classiflcation GRP2-GRP5 is an administrative clas-
siflcation, deflned by the Portuguese Ministry of Health; (b) regions are
Administrative Health Regions.
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Table 2: Variable Descriptions Continued
NAME DEFINITION
PD430 primary diagnosis Subarachnoid hemorrhage ( ICD-9-CM 430)
PD431 primary diagnosis Intracerebral hemorrhage ( 431)
PD4320 primary diagosis Nontraumatic extradural hemorrhage (432.0)
PD4321 primary diagnosis Subdural hemorrhage (432.1)
PD4329 primary diagnosis Unspecifled intracranial hemorrhage (432.9)
PD4340 primary diagnosis Cerebral thrombosis (434.0)
PD4341 primary diagnosis Cerebral embolism (434.1)
PD436 primary diagnosis Acute, but ill-deflned crebrovascular disease (436)
PD4373 primary diagnosis Cerebral aneurysm, nonruptured (437.3)
PD7843 primary diagnosis Aphasia (784.3)
SD486 secondary diagnosis of Pneumonia organism NOS (486)
SD4280 secondary diagnosis of Congestive heart failure (428.0)
SD4281 secondary diagnosis of Left heart failure (428.1)
SD4289 secondary diagnosis of Heart failure NOS (428.9)
SD481 secondary diagnosis of Pneumococcal pneumonia (481)
SD4829 secondary diagnosis of Bacterial Pneumonia NOS (482.9)
SD485 secondary diagnosis of Bronchopneumonia, NOS (485)
SD5849 secondary diagnosis of Acute renal failure NOS (584.9)
SD585 secondary diagnosis of Chronic renal failure NOS (585)
SD586 secondary diagnosis of Renal failure NOS (586)
SD5712 secondary diagnosis of Alcoholic cirrhosis of liver (571.2)
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLE MEAN STD DEV
ALIVE .7773541 .416024
MIDAGE .2684603 .44316
OLD .5017148 .4999988
VERYOLD .228078 .4195947
MALE .5039516 .4999862
TRANSIN .102486 .3032874
URGADM .8761619 .329398
SNS .8523173 .3547864
1992 .1111419 .3143089
1993 .127069 .3330514
1994 .1297531 .3360328
1995 .1341627 .3408283
1996 .1474625 .3545677
1997 .1467098 .3538177
1998 .1520425 .3590634
NOCAT .3966726 .4892087
ONECAT .4347187 .4957218
CAT .5891258 .4919942
GRP2 .321972 .467234
GRP3 .0053469 .0729271
GRP4 .5431694 .4981347
GRP5 .1263234 .3322147
NORTH .3185778 .4659265
CENTRAL .2634756 .4405197
ALANTEJO .0507353 .2194574
ALGARVE .0357739 .1857266
24
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics Continued
VARIABLE MEAN STD DEV
PD430 .0163461 .1268029
PD431 .1464755 .3535835
PD4320 .0008308 .0288116
PD4321 .0097281 .0981506
PD4329 .0186538 .1352996
PD4340 .204624 .4034281
PD4341 .0145354 .1196837
PD4349 .3075503 .4614809
PD436 .2764345 .4472359
PD4373 .0039765 .0629339
PD7843 .000845 .0290566
SD486 .0290139 .1678461
SD4280 .0187177 .1355268
SD4281 .0035007 .0590633
SD4289 .0038841 .062202
SD481 .0026628 .0515338
SD4829 .009224 .0955978
SD485 .0097707 .0983632
SD5849 .0042321 .0649169
SD585 .0131649 .113981
SD586 .0042179 .0648083
SD5712 .0028119 .0529531
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Table 5: Probit for the Health Status Equation
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT z p > jzj
CONSTANT 1.259641 15.410 0.000
MIDAGE -.0040099 -0.054 0.957
OLD -.1959544 -2.630 0.009
VERYOLD -.408544 -5.466 0.000
MALE -.0144551 -2.500 0.012
TRANSIN -.5003517 -16.912 0.000
URGADM -.4116199 -14.859 0.000
PD430 -.3748965 -17.248 0.000
PD431 -.4139447 -41.910 0.000
PD4320 .0749847 0.636 0.525
PD4321 -.3865966 -14.628 0.000
PD4329 -.188884 -7.425 0.000
PD4340 -.0117405 -1.134 0.257
PD4341 -.0367491 -1.440 0.150
PD436 -.2445699 -23.272 0.000
PD4373 .2784135 3.678 0.000
PD7843 .7109804 3.743 0.000
SD486 -.4309944 -27.765 0.000
SD481 -.5482991 -11.207 0.000
SD4280 -.1876719 -9.560 0.000
SD4281 -.2607063 -5.766 0.000
SD4289 -.1411173 -3.212 0.001
SD4829 -.3715191 -13.552 0.000
SD485 -.4455322 -16.865 0.000
SD5849 -.5834706 -15.213 0.000
SD585 -.2365623 -10.264 0.000
SD586 -.3285104 -8.204 0.000
SD5712 -.2033436 -4.220 0.000
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Table 6: Probit for the Health Status Equation Continued
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT z p > jzj
1992 .0324109 2.089 0.037
1993 .0332731 2.219 0.026
1994 .0594012 4.047 0.000
1995 .0374745 2.605 0.009
1996 .0241094 1.715 0.086
1997 .0179912 1.295 0.195
1998 .0133962 0.974 0.330
CAT .6354571 28.223 0.000
Note: 57 of 78 hospital coe–cients are signiflcantly difierent at the 95% or
99% confldence level.
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Table 7: Probit for the CAT Scan Utitlization Equation
VARIABLE Coe–cient z p > jzj
CONSTANT 3.113652 36.218 0.000
NHS -.2448051 -4.498 0.000
NOCAT -1.251719 -74.765 0.000
ONECAT -.688168 -50.023 0.000
GRP2 -1.116164 -16.156 0.000
GRP3 -1.51132 -17.957 0.000
GRP4 -.9638382 -14.131 0.000
GRP5 -1.572044 -22.805 0.000
1992 -1.25392 -21.285 0.000
1993 -.9856612 -17.460 0.000
1994 -.7421068 -12.979 0.000
1995 -.5481388 -9.483 0.000
1996 -.5237258 -9.230 0.000
1997 -.3830189 -6.687 0.000
1998 -.1699833 -2.899 0.004
NHS92 -.0160209 -0.255 0.799
NHS93 -.1829312 -3.029 0.002
NHS94 -.0767691 -1.259 0.208
NHS95 -.0959297 -1.559 0.119
NHS96 .0346843 0.573 0.566
NHS97 .1773061 2.903 0.004
NHS98 .0562109 0.902 0.367
NORTH -.1350657 -14.146 0.000
CENTRAL -.2727925 -27.235 0.000
ALENTEJO -.6495152 -35.092 0.000
ALGARVE -.220718 -10.574 0.000
Number of obs = 140829
Log likelihood = -146583.45
Wald chi2(112) = 5984.15
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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